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
For many years, critics of Britain’s democratic system have argued that it is 
atrophying. They have claimed that citizens are able to exert only weak control 
over a system of government that finds it difficult to meet popular needs and
demands because of its centralised nature (Barnett, 1993). But in 1997 the 
Conservative government, whose leader, John Major, had enthused about the 
traditions  and  institutions  of  British  life,  was  replaced  by  a  Labour 
administration which embraced calls for the reform of many of those same
institutions. For example, less than a year before becoming Prime Minister,
Tony Blair argued:
Changing  the way we govern, and not just changing our 
government, is no longer an optional extra for Britain. So low is
public esteem for politicians and the system we operate that
there is now little authority for us to use unless and until we
first succeed in regaining it (Blair, 1996).
One of the main weapons in Labour’s attempt to restore public confidence in 
Britain’s political system was a programme of constitutional reform. Indeed the 
implementation of that programme was arguably the most striking characteristic
of Mr Blair’s first administration. It included the creation of new devolved 
institutions in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London, the strengthening 
of individual rights through a Human Rights Act, the removal of the bulk of
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hereditary  peers from the House of Lords and the introduction of new 
proportional voting systems for both devolved and European elections.
Yet for those who hoped that such reforms would rekindle public confidence 
and involvement in Britain’s democracy, the 2001 election held at the end of
Labour’s first term was a serious disappointment. After already having been
lower in 1997 than at any time since 1935, turnout fell by another 12 points to 
its lowest level since 1918.1 A little under three in five people in Great Britain
(59.1 per cent) voted. Turnout also fell to record low levels in the local and
European elections held between 1998 and 2000. It appears that Britain faces a 
crisis of confidence and participation that is far deeper than any programme of
constitutional reform is capable of reversing.
This chapter examines whether this is really the case. We do so in three stages.
First, we examine trends in attitudes towards the political system and in political
participation in a broad sense – from voting to signing a petition or going on a 
demonstration. Next, we consider public attitudes towards Labour’s programme
of constitutional reform and the impact this appears to have had on attitudes
towards the political system. Finally, we examine whether long-term changes in
British society are undermining confidence in the political system in a way that
Labour’s programme of constitutional reform could not hope to address.
Is there a ‘crisis’ of participation in Britain?
Our first question is whether the low turnout at recent elections is symptomatic 
of a wider public malaise with Britain’s political system. This might take one of
two forms. On the one hand, people may be losing interest in politics and,
consequently, becoming not only less likely to vote but also less likely to take
part in other forms of political participation. On the other hand, people may still 
be interested in politics, but no longer believe that the political system responds 
to such a conventional activity as voting. As a result, they may have become
more inclined to engage in ‘unconventional’ political activities such as going on
protests and demonstrations (Dalton, 1999; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1995; 
Marsh, 1977). After all, the last few years have been marked by notable
examples of these sort of protests, ranging from the anti-globalisation protesters
at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa to the coalition of farmers and lorry drivers
who brought many parts of Britain to a near standstill in 2000 in protest against
high fuel prices.
There are two ways we can examine whether either of these suppositions is 
correct. First, we can look at what actions people say they would take if 
parliament were considering a law that they thought was “really unjust and
harmful”. Second, we can examine the actions that people say they have ever
taken in response to what they thought was an unjust and harmful government 
action. The advantage of the former measure is that it gives us an indication of
people’s current reported propensity to engage in politics (and so should be 
sensitive  to  any  changes  in  willingness to  participate over  time).  Its
disadvantage of course is that it does not measure actual participation. The latter 
measure does measure this, but as it asks people to report any actions they have
% saying they would 1983 1986 1989 1991 1994 1998 2000
Sign a petition 55 65 71 78 67 67 68
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taken over their lifetime, the figures that it generates will be less immediately 
responsive to changes in people’s willingness to participate.
The next table shows recent trends in reported willingness to engage in various
forms of political activity. Two points stand out. First, there is no evidence at all 
of a decline in people’s reported willingness to engage. The proportion saying
now that they would not do anything in response to an unjust law has barely
changed at all across the years. In fact, the number of actions that people say 
they are willing to undertake has actually tended to increase over time. True, at
32 per cent, the proportion who say they would take three or more actions is a 
little lower now than it was in 1998 (when 37 per cent said they would do this), 
but both figures are well above the 14 per cent who named this many actions in
1983 or even the 25 per cent who did so in 1986. Second, while the proportion 
saying they would go on a protest or a demonstration is now twice what it was
in 1983, much of that increase had in fact occurred by the beginning of the
1990s. Since then there has been no consistent increase in reported willingness
to engage in this sort of activity. Indeed the one and only apparently consistent 
change in what people say they are prepared to do is to contact the media, a 
reflection perhaps of the media’s greater interest in audience participation
(Davis and Curtice, 2000).
Table 1 Potential political action, 1983-2000
Speak to an influential
Contact a government
Looking at what people say they have done as opposed to what they say they
would do confirms that there has been no decline in overall levels of political
participation. In our most recent survey, just over  half  say that they have 
undertaken at least one action in response to a government action they 
considered unjust and harmful. In 1994, when we last asked this question, the
figure was a little under a half, as it was in 1986 when we first asked it. Indeed,
the proportion who claim to have taken three or more actions has slowly but
consistently risen from five per cent in 1986 to nine per cent now.
Nor is there much sign of change in the kinds of political activity in which 
people engage. Few have ever taken part in significant time-consuming activity,
but then it has always been thus. Signing a petition remains by far and away the
most common form of non-electoral participation, a relatively undemanding and
perhaps fleeting activity. However, we can see that there has been a small but
consistent increase over time in the proportion of people who have been on a 
protest or a demonstration. So perhaps here we do have a sign that there has
been some increase at least in more unconventional forms of political activity
that might reflect frustration with the conventional workings of democracy.
But one further piece of evidence casts doubt upon this interpretation. For the
most part people engage in these unconventional forms of political participation
as well as, rather than instead of, voting. Thus, 87 per cent of those who had
ever been on a protest or a demonstration said they voted in the 1997 general
election, compared with only 71 per cent of those who had not been on a 
protest. When it comes to voting in the 1999 European election, the equivalent
figures are 50 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. Similar differences are
found in relation to all of the other activities in the following table. So there
does not appear to be a wholesale shift away from the ballot box to the streets.
Table 2 Actual political action, 1986-2000
% saying they had 1986 1989 1991 1994 2000
Signed a petition 34 41 53 39 42
Contacted their MP 11 15 17 14 16
Contacted radio, TV or newspaper 3 4 4 5 6
Gone on a protest or demonstration 6 8 9 9 10
Spoken to an influential person 1 3 5 3 4
Contacted a government department 3 3 4 3 4
Formed a group of like-minded people












None of these 56 48 37 53 47
Base 1548 1516 1445 1137 2293
Confidence in the political system
These findings suggest that recent low election turnouts do not appear to be 
symptomatic of a wider malaise. There is little evidence that other forms of 
political participation are in decline or that people are resorting to such activities 
instead of voting.2 If anything, the opposite is the case. Perhaps, after all, people
are reasonably content with the way that their democracy is working?
We can assess this in two ways. First we consider how much trust people have
in key political institutions and  sets of actors. Then we examine ‘political
efficacy’, that is the confidence that people have in their ability to articulate
demands effectively and in the ability of the political system to respond to them.
According to Almond and Verba (1963), a democracy requires a balance of
efficacy and trust amongst its citizens in order to perform effectively. They need
to feel that they can make their views known when necessary, but they should
be equally willing to trust their rulers to make the right decisions most of the
time.
In truth, we are not (and never have been) very trustful of governments and 
politicians. As the next table shows, only around one in ten of us trust 
politicians of any party to tell the truth when they are in a tight corner “just 
about always” or “most of the time”, a figure that has not changed at all in 
recent years. However there has been a clear change of mood when it comes to
our willingness to trust governments to put the needs of the nation above the 
interests of their own party. Up to (and including) 1991 at least one in three of
us trusted governments to do this at least most of the time. But during the 1990s
there was a gradual erosion of that trust and now only one in six, a new all time 
low, take this view of government. True, there appeared to be something of a 
recovery in the immediate wake of Labour’s election victory in 1997 (as 
registered by our 1998 survey), but this appears to have been only a temporary
halt.
Politicians cannot blame this apparently growing cynicism about their motives
on any increasing tendency amongst the electorate simply to distrust all those in
authority. As the following table also shows, there has been no equivalent
growing distrust of either the police or civil servants. Indeed we now appear to 
be more trustful of both of these than we were for much of the 1990s, with the
police in particular having apparently been particularly successful at recapturing
public confidence. Almost three in five of us now trust them not to bend the
rules to try and get a conviction.
Table 3 Trends in political trust, 1974-2000
% who trust the following
“just about always” or “most
of the time” 1974 1987 1991 1994 1996 1998 2000
British governments of any 
party to place the needs of 
the nation above the
interests of their own political 
party
Politicians of any party to tell 
the truth when they are in a 
tight corner
British police not to bend the
rules in trying to get a 
conviction
Top civil servants to stand firm 
against a minister who wants 
to provide false information
to parliament
39 37 33 24 22 29 16
- - - 9 9 9 11
- 52 49 47 51 48 59
- 46 - 27 28 - 35
Base 1802 1410 1445 1137 1180 2071 2293
Source: 1974: Political Action  Study.  1987  figure for  civil  servants: British
Election Study 1987 (Base = 3414).
So on our first measure at least it appears that confidence in the workings of our 
representative democracy has declined, and that far from being reversed during 
Labour’s first term, has eroded even further. But what happens when we look at 
our second measure, political efficacy? Here we should draw a distinction 
between two aspects of efficacy. On the one hand, the public will have views
about the ability and willingness of the political system to respond to any
demands they may make. We refer to this as ‘system efficacy’. On the other
hand, people will have more or less confidence in their own ability to express
demands. This we term ‘personal efficacy’. While at any one time those who
feel personally efficacious also tend to be those who feel that the system is
efficacious (Pattie and Johnston, 2001a), this does not necessarily mean that 
trends in personal and system efficacy should parallel each other over time. 
Rather, if it is the case that people have lost confidence in the political system
then we might well expect to find that system efficacy has declined while
personal efficacy has remained the same or even increased.
As in the case of trust, we have to bear in mind that a considerable degree of 
scepticism has always existed. Clear majorities have always agreed with each of
the indicators of system and personal efficacy in the next two tables. So, to
identify whether levels of efficacy have declined, we look just at those who
strongly agree with each of the statements.
Table 4 Trends in system efficacy, 1974-2000
% strongly agree 1974 1987 1991 1994 1996 1998 2000
Parties are only interested in
people’s votes, not in their 
opinions
Generally speaking, those we 
elect as MPs lose touch with 
people pretty quickly
It doesn’t really matter which 
party is in power, in the end 
things go on much the same
MPs don’t care much about
19 15 16 25 28 21 26
19 16 16 25 26 20 23
- - 11 16 16 17 19
what people like me think - - - - 15 - 14
Base 1802 1410 1445 1137 1180 2071 2293
Source: 1974: Political Action Study. In that study respondents were given a four-point 
scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. In the subsequent
British Social Attitudes studies answers were given on a five-point scale with a 
mid-point labelled “neither agree nor disagree”.
The picture revealed by the previous table is clear. As in the case of political
trust, levels of system efficacy fell in the 1990s, recovered somewhat in the
wake of Labour’s election in 1997, but have now fallen back to more or less
where they were in the mid-1990s. Thus, for example, in 1987 only around one
in six strongly agreed that, “parties are only interested in people’s votes, not in 
their opinions”, or that “generally speaking those we elect as MPs lose touch
with people pretty quickly”. But by 1996 just over one in four subscribed to 
each of these views, and while these figures fell again to around one in five in
1998, they have now returned to around one in four.
In contrast, for the most part levels of personal efficacy show little or no 
consistent trend. For instance, the proportion strongly agreeing that “people like
me have no say in what the government does” or that politics and government 
can be too complicated to understand is little different now to what it was when
the questions were first asked in the British Social Attitudes survey in 1986.
In short, while there seems to have been little long-term change in people’s 
confidence in their own political abilities, confidence in the political system’s
ability to respond to public demands does appear to have declined. Moreover, 
that confidence does not appear to have been restored during Labour’s first term
of office.
% strongly agree
People like me have no say
1974 1987 1991 1994 1996 1998 2000
in what the government 
does
14 20 16 28 24 17 25
people like me can have 
any say about how the 15 - 12 19 15 14 17
government does things
government seem so 
complicated that a person 21 - 16 22 22 15 18
like me cannot really 
understand what is going 
on
Table 5 Trends in personal efficacy, 1974-2000
Voting is the only way
Sometimes politics and
Base 1802 1410 1445 1137 1180 2071 2293
Source: 1974: Political Action Study. See also note to table 9.4.
There is one further indication of confidence in government that we can 
examine. This was first asked by the Kilbrandon Commission on the 
Constitution in the early 1970s and has been asked periodically by a number of 
surveys ever since. It reads:
Which of these statements best describes your opinion on the 
present system of governing Britain?
It works extremely well and could not be improved
It could be improved in small ways but mainly works well
It could be improved quite a lot
It needs a great deal of improvement
Thus the question not only asks people to consider how well the political system
is performing but also how much could be done to improve it. Responses to it 
largely confirm the picture painted by our two other measures. Thus, the 
proportion believing that the system needs little or no improvement reached an 
all-time low (with just 22 per cent agreeing) in 1995. The advent of the Labour 
government then saw a significant revival of confidence with nearly half saying
that the system needed little or no improvement in 1998, as high as the figure
the Kilbrandon Commission itself found in 1973. But now the figure has fallen 
again. True it remains above the level it reached in the mid-1990s, but our
finding that only 35 per cent think that the  system needs little or no 
improvement suggests that Labour’s programme of constitutional reform has
not  had much permanent impact on people’s confidence in how they are 
governed.3
Table 6 Trends in evaluations of system of government, 1973-2000
% saying system of
governing Britain
could … 1973 1977 1991 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000
… not be improved or
could be improved 
only in small ways
… be improved quite a
48 34 33 22 35 45 48 35
lot or a great deal 49 62 63 76 63 51 50 63
Base 4892 1410 1034 1758 1180 2071 1060 2293
Sources: 1973: Royal Commission on the Constitution, Memorandum of Dissent, 1973;
1977: Opinion Research Centre Survey; 1991/1995: MORI/Rowntree Trust State of the
Nation Survey.
The decline in public confidence during the mid-1990s could have reflected the
fact that Britain was then being governed by a government, headed by John
Major, which was particularly unpopular and was also mired in allegations of
‘sleaze’? But if that were the case then its replacement by a new government, let 
alone one committed to a programme of constitutional reform, should have been
sufficient to restore confidence. And according to each of our three measures
that evidently has not been the case; the new Labour government has not, as yet
at least, restored the bonds between citizens and their political system. It 
appears instead that there is a more fundamental crisis of confidence in the
political system.
Indeed further confirmation that relatively little has changed under Labour
comes from the next table which compares levels of efficacy and trust in 1996
(towards the end of John Major’s administration) among people who strongly 
identified with either the Conservative or Labour parties or with no party at all, 
with the same groups now. Unsurprisingly, we find that levels of trust and 
efficacy are for the most part higher among strong Labour identifiers now than
they were in 1996 when the Conservatives were in power. Meanwhile the
opposite pattern is true of Conservative identifiers. But among those with no 
party political identity levels of efficacy are just as low now as they were in
1996, and their level of trust in government has plummeted.
Table 7 Trends in efficacy and trust by party identification, 1996-2000
1996 2000








interested in votes 33 18 35 19 25 35
MPs lose touch too
quickly 34 15 30 19 26 30
Doesn’t matter who in
power 18 7 27 12 15 34
% who trust govern-
ments always/most
of the time to put 
nation’s interests first
19 34 18 28 19 5
Base 284 186 110 434 304 308
But are we correct in assuming that a decline in levels of trust and efficacy 
necessarily represents a crisis for the political system? Should we assume that
those with low levels of trust are ready to opt out of the political system? Or
might a decline simply indicate a public which is less willing to take elected
officials’ words for granted, and is keener to scrutinise their activities? After all, 
such scrutiny may be necessary if the public is to ensure that politicians do what
they want them to do, especially in a country where general elections may be as
much as five years apart (Hardin, 2000). So, far from wanting to withdraw from
democracy might those with low levels of trust and efficacy wish instead to see
democracy improved (see also Klingemann, 1999)?
Previous analyses of British Social Attitudes’ data have themselves cast some
doubt on whether those with low level of trust and efficacy are necessarily less 
likely to participate in elections (Curtice and Jowell, 1995, 1997). However,
other research has identified some relationship between abstention and either
trust or efficacy (Heath and Taylor, 1999; Pattie and Johnston, 2001b), although
other factors (particularly the perceived distance between the parties and the
closeness of the contest) appear to be more important. That there is indeed a 
link between trust, efficacy and turnout is also supported by analysis of data
from our most recent survey. So, for example, 78 per cent of those who trust
governments to put the interest of the nation first at least most of the time claim
to have voted in the 1997 election, compared with only 62 per cent of those who
almost never trust governments. The figures for those with high and low levels 
of political efficacy are almost identical,4 and there are differences of a similar 
kind in respect of voting in the 1999 European elections too.
Table 8 Political participation by levels of trust and efficacy
Trust government to put interests of the nation first …
… just about
% voted in 1997
always or most of 
the time
… only some of
the time … almost never
general election 78 76 62
% voted in 1999
Euro election 46 38 29
% ever taken
political action 50 54 52
Base 368 1336 566
Level of system efficacy
% voted in 1997
High Medium Low
general election 85 79 69
% voted in 1999
Euro election 60 44 33
% ever taken
political action 73 59 49
Base 99 480 1345
This apparent change in the relationship between electoral participation and 
political trust and efficacy suggests that, even if it were not initially the case,
declining levels of trust and efficacy are helping to undermine turnout at the
ballot box. Perhaps initial disillusionment with the system has relatively little 
impact on willingness to vote, but more prolonged disillusionment then begins
to have an effect on certain types of voters? But even if this is the case, we 
should be wary on the basis of the evidence presented here of assuming that
falling trust and efficacy explain the large drop in turnout between 1997 and
2001. After all, levels of efficacy are no lower now than they were before the
1997 election. And the drop since 1996 in levels of trust in government is 
insufficient to be able to account for the 12-point drop in electoral participation 
between 1997 and 2001.5
The above table also helps explain why we could find little evidence earlier of
a decline in non-electoral participation despite the apparent decline in trust and
efficacy. It shows that, while there is a relationship between system efficacy and
ever having done anything in response to a government action that was thought 
to be unjust and harmful, there is no apparent relationship between engaging in
non-electoral forms of political participation and trust in government.
So, the decline  in confidence in government that emerged under  the last 
Conservative administration was not reversed during Labour’s first term. True,
this may have only made a contribution to the decline in turnout at recent
elections rather than being principally responsible for it. And there is no 
evidence of any decline in other forms of political participation. But it does 
appear that Labour’s programme of constitutional reform has, so far at least,
failed to reconnect citizens with their politicians. We now turn to addressing
why this is the case.
The impact of constitutional change
Reformers believed that constitutional reform would address grievances that the
public have about the way that they are governed. And our own previous work
also gave reason to believe that it might have a favourable impact. This is
because throughout the 1990s those with lower levels of political trust were, for
the most part, more likely to have a favourable view of constitutional reform
than those with higher levels of trust (Curtice and Jowell, 1995, 1997). We 
therefore  surmised  that  perhaps  their  trust  would  be  restored  should
constitutional reform be implemented.
But of course, implementing constitutional reform could only help restore 
public confidence in Britain’s system of government if people actually welcome
its impact in practice. The next table shows what impact people think four
examples of constitutional reform have had on the way that Britain is governed.
So far at least, the perception appears to be not much. Reform of the House of 
Lords, freedom of information, and the creation of the Scottish Parliament and 
the Welsh Assembly are each judged by a majority to have currently made no
difference to the way Britain is run. True, in each case more feel that the reform
in question has improved matters rather than made them worse, but with the
exception of freedom of information the positive balance is only a small one.
Of course,  these figures do not directly address the question  of whether 
constitutional reform has increased trust and efficacy among the general public. 
Moreover, the fact that trust and efficacy have not risen may reflect other 
influences which have counteracted any beneficial impact that constitutional 
reform might have had. To assess this, we can conduct two additional analyses. 
First, we compare the relationship between political trust and attitudes towards 
constitutional change in 1996 (before reform was implemented) and 2000 (by 
which time much of Labour’s programme was in place). If reform has had a 
positive impact we would expect to find that trust and efficacy have risen more 
among those favouring the constitutional reforms that have been implemented
than they have among those who are less favourable.
Table 9 Evaluations of constitutional reform
Perceived impact on the way Britain as a whole is 
governed …
Reforming the House
… improved it 
a lot/a little
… made no 
difference
… made it a 
little/ a lot 
worse
of Lords % 11 69 8
Introducing freedom of
information % 25 59 3
Creating the Scottish
Parliament % 19 53 13
Creating the Welsh
Assembly % 15 56 12
Base: 2293
The following table undertakes this exercise in relation to freedom of 
information. It does so by looking at people’s  views about whether  the 
government should have “the right to keep its defence plans secret” or whether
they  think “the public has a right to know what they are”. Of course, the
question we examine here does not address the government’s freedom of
information  legislation directly (as it posits a greater freedom than that 
legislation has put in place). But we might reasonably assume that the 45 per
cent who say that the public has the right to know such plans comprises those 
who would be most committed to the principle of freedom of information. But, 
if this is the case, then Labour’s legislation seems to have done little to raise
their confidence in the political system. Rather, their level of trust has fallen just
as much as has the confidence of those who think the government has the right
to keep its defence plans secret, while their level of efficacy has actually fallen
more.
These findings do not apply only in respect of freedom of information; they 
equally apply to views about Scottish devolution. Thus, despite the advent of 
the Scottish Parliament in 1999, levels of trust and efficacy fell by more or less 
the same amount between 1996 and 2000 among those who favour devolution 
as they did among those who do not think Scotland should have any kind of
parliament at all.
Attitudes towards 
defence plans 1996 2000 Change 1996 2000 Change
Public should normally have 
right to know 19 13 -6 35 26 -9
Base 521 877 521 877
Government should have 
right to keep plans secret 26 18 -8 37 33 -4
Base 614 1338 614 1338
Table 10 Changes in trust and efficacy by views about freedom of information,
1996-2000
% trust government just 
about always/most of the 
time
% medium/high efficacy
Our second way of examining the impact of constitutional reform is to compare
what has happened in a part of Great Britain that has experienced high profile 
constitutional change and another part that has not. The most obvious example
is devolution – which has been introduced to a significant extent in Scotland but
not in England. If devolution has restored confidence in how Britain is governed
we should find more favourable trends in trust and efficacy in Scotland than in 
England. But, as the next table reveals, trends in both trust and efficacy have
almost been identical in Scotland and England over the course of the last three
years (for further details see Curtice, 2001, forthcoming).
Table 11 Trust and efficacy in England and Scotland, 1997-2000
% strongly agree 1997 2000
Change
97-00
Parties only interested in votes, not England 16 26 +10
in opinions Scotland 16 24 +8
It doesn’t really matter who’s in England 8 19 +11
power, things go on the same Scotland 8 20 +12
Base: England 2187 1928
Base: Scotland 756 1663
% who trust the Government to put England 34 17 -17
nation before party “just about
always” or “ most of the time”
Scotland 29 13 -16
Base: England 2551 1928
Base: Scotland 882 1663
Sources: 1997 England: British Election Study; 1997 Scotland: Scottish Election
Study 1997; 2000 Scotland: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2000.
So it appears that Labour’s programme of constitutional reform has indeed
done little or nothing so far to increase people’s confidence in how they are
governed.
But of course our findings may well not represent the public’s final word on 
Labour’s programme of constitutional reform. Certainly, advocates of reform 
might reasonably argue that it will take time for its benefits to become apparent.
Indeed, the UK government’s freedom of information legislation had not even
come into force by the time of our survey. But, by this argument, it is also clear
that constitutional reform has not been an immediate remedy for declining trust
and efficacy.
Alternatively, advocates of reform might be tempted to argue that its inability
to increase people’s confidence in government reflects its failure to go far
enough. Indeed in its 2001 General Election handbook, the constitutional 
reform lobby, Charter88, argue that Britain needs a full blown ‘Citizens’ 
Constitution’ (Holden, 2001). In particular, some point to the fact that Labour
has failed to implement the one piece of its constitutional programme that they 
see as having the most potential  impact on the way Britain is governed –
holding a referendum on whether the House of Commons should be elected by
an alternative, more proportional, electoral system.
However, as we have previously argued (Curtice and Jowell, 1995), it is far
from clear that electoral reform is sufficiently popular for the public to even
vote in its favour, let alone respond to its introduction by showing higher levels
of trust and efficacy. In our most recent survey, just 35 per cent think that we
should “change the voting system for general elections to the House of
Commons to allow smaller political parties to get a fairer share of MPs”, little 
different from the readings that have been obtained in response to this question
on a number of occasions since 1983. Moreover, if it is the case that the current
low level of trust and efficacy reflects a feeling that constitutional reform has 
not been sufficiently extensive, then we should find that trust and efficacy has
fallen more over the last four years amongst the one-third or so who say they
are in favour of changing the electoral system than it has amongst those who say
they want to keep the system as it is. However, if anything the opposite is the 
case. For example, the percentage willing to trust governments at least most of 
the time fell by just three points between 1996 and 2000 among those in favour 
of electoral reform but by eight points amongst those wanting to keep the 
existing system.
Perhaps this is to take too narrow a view of the kinds of change to the political
system that the public would like to see. After all, all the reforms we have
considered so far are ones that still assume a framework of representative 
democracy in which parties compete at election time for the power to take
decisions for the next four or five years. But perhaps what the public wants are 
more opportunities to participate in the process of decision making itself
(Dalton, 1999: 74-77). After all, no less than 55 per cent disagreed and only 21
per cent agreed when we put the proposition to them that “even if I had the 
chance I would not be interested in having more say in government decisions”. 
Moreover, as many as 40 per cent disagreed (although 43 per cent agreed) that,
“between elections, the government should get on with running the country
rather than bothering about public opinion”.
One of the more participatory forms of decision making that has been 
introduced in recent years by some local councils  is the ‘citizens’  jury’. 
Information pertinent to a decision that a local council has to make is presented
to a small group of residents, sometimes selected at random, which is then
invited to consider what decision they would  make (Coote and Lenaghan,
1997). In order to tap attitudes towards this rather different kind of approach we
asked our respondents how much they would trust the councillors on their local
council to come to the “best view” about a proposed “major new building
development in their neighbourhood” and how much they would trust “a jury of
12 ordinary local people chosen at random”. The jury was clearly the more 
trusted device; nearly two-thirds said that they would trust this group to come to
the best view “just about always” or “most of the time”, whereas only one-third
said the same of their local councillors.
But what matters for our purposes here is how people’s views on these matters
vary according to their trust in government or level of political efficacy. And 
there is some evidence to suggest that differences do exist. Among those who
trust governments to put the interests of the nation first at least most of the time,
nearly half (48 per cent) also trust local councillors to come to the best view
about a planning development  at  least “most of the time”, double the
comparable figure among those who do not trust governments in this way (only
26 per cent of whom would trust local councillors in this way). By contrast,
these two groups only differ by six percentage points in their views about the 
ability of a citizens’ jury to come to the best view. So those with low levels of 
trust in government are almost as likely to trust a citizens’ jury as are those with
high levels of trust, but are much less likely to trust councillors to make the
same decision. We find a similar pattern if we compare the attitudes of those
with low and high levels of efficacy.
So we have found that Labour’s programme of constitutional reform seems to 
have done little to increase people’s confidence in their system of government.
So far at least, those reforms have evidently had too little impact upon the
public to be able to do so. Maybe over time they might have more success in
increasing confidence. And it might be that more radical departures from the
norms of representative democracy would be more successful. But, in truth,
perhaps changing the way in which Britain is governed is simply not the right
antidote to declining public trust and confidence. Perhaps the causes lie 
elsewhere, reflecting more fundamental and long-term changes in British
society and government. It is to these questions that we now turn.
What accounts for declining political trust?
A wide range of explanations has been offered as to why people’s confidence in
how they are governed is falling, not just in Britain but in much of the 
developed world. Here we evaluate four of those explanations.6
The relative capacity of governments
The first of these explanations is that people no longer think governments can 
meet public needs and expectations. On the one hand, thanks to rising levels of
education and personal affluence, people’s expectations of what governments
and politicians should achieve have increased. But, on the other hand, thanks to 
the process of globalisation, governments have lost much of their ability to
influence the direction of their country’s economy or to pursue distinctive social
policies (Giddens, 1994). The resulting gap between what voters expect, and
what they think governments can deliver, is held to produce negative attitudes 
towards political institutions. We might call this explanation the ‘relative
capacity’ argument.
We have available to us two measures of whether people’s expectations of 
politicians and government are rising or not. The first of these comprises what 
qualities people think it is important for MPs to have. As the next table shows,
up to and including 1996 it did appear plausible to argue that expectations of
MPs were rising. But now our latest survey has seen expectations fall back 
again. True, two qualities, “knowing about poverty” and being “independent 
minded”, are still clearly more important to people now than when we first
asked this question in 1983. But, so far as most of the other qualities are
concerned, the picture now is little different to what it was in 1983.
Table 12 Expectations of MPs, 1983-2000
% who think it is important for MPs to … 1983 1994 1996 2000
… be independent minded 37 48 51 56
… be well educated 50 55 60 54
… be from the local area 48 60 61 54
… be loyal to their party 42 42 44 43
… know about poverty 27 41 45 42
… have business experience 22 30 34 28
… have union experience 14 13 14 14
Base 1761 2302 1180 2293
Our  second measure comprises people’s views on what responsibilities 
governments should fulfil. In the following table we show the proportion of
people who think that each of four possible responsibilities should “definitely” 
fall within the remit of government. Here the trends are almost the reverse of 
what we saw in Table 9.12. Thus, up to and including 1996, expectations of
government appeared to be falling rather than rising. In each case the proportion
saying the objective in question  should definitely be the government’s
responsibility was lower than it was ten years earlier. But in our most recent
survey that trend has been reversed; in all four cases the proportion saying the
objective should definitely be the government’s responsibility is now either at 
least as high or higher than it was in 1986.
Table 13 Expectations of government, 1986-2000
% who think it definitely should be the 
government’s responsibility to … 1986 1990 1996 2000
… provide health care for all 84 84 81 87
… provide a decent standard of living for the old 80 77 70 80
… keep prices under control 52 47 40 64
… provide a job for everyone who wants one 30 23 26 39
Base 1321 1197 989 2008
So neither of our measures easily substantiates the claim that there is a gradual,
secular increase in people’s expectations of politicians and government. Still, it 
is just about possible to argue that expectations appear to be at least a little 
higher now than they were in the 1980s. But what about people’s perceptions of
the ability of governments to deliver? Is there indeed a gap between what
people think governments should do and what they think they are actually
capable of delivering? Might this account for low levels of trust and efficacy?
In our 2000 survey, for the first time, we followed questions about what 
governments should do by ones that asked people how easy or difficult they
thought it was for government to ensure that each objective was achieved. And
indeed, there is a clear recognition that many objectives are not at all easy to
deliver. Only 47 per cent think that it is easy for government to ensure that all 
old people have a decent standard of living (compared with 80 per cent who 
think that this is definitely government’s responsibility), 42 per cent that it is
easy to ensure that everyone has good access to adequate health care, and only
31 per cent that it is easy for governments  to keep prices  under control. 
Meanwhile, just 16 per cent think it is easy for government to ensure that 
everyone who wants a job has one.
But is this disjuncture responsible for low trust and efficacy? If it is, we should
find lower levels of trust than average among those who believe that a particular
objective should be the government’s  responsibility and who also think it 
difficult for the government to ensure that it happens. But this is not what we
find. In the following table we illustrate this by showing the level of trust and
efficacy among those who think that government should be responsible for
ensuring that everyone who wants a job has one, broken down by whether they
think that objective is easy or difficult for governments to fulfil. And, if
anything, those whom it might be thought would be concerned about the
relative incapacity of government (that is, who think it difficult for governments
to ensure everyone has a job) are very slightly more trustful and efficacious than
those who think it is easy. So, in practice then, it is those who think that it is
easy for governments to deliver who are most likely to be disillusioned by their
actual  performance. It is thus perhaps good rather than bad news for
governments that many people apparently recognise that in a number of respects
politicians do not have an easy job.
Table 14 The impact of perceptions of government on trust and efficacy
Believe ensuring everyone 
who wants a job has one is




% with medium or high efficacy 28 30
Base 308 1331
Table confined to those respondents who say that providing a job for everyone
who wants one should “definitely” be the government’s responsibility.
Postmaterialism
Our three remaining theories suggest, in different ways, that the decline in
people’s confidence in government is the result of wider social changes. The 
first of these theories is postmaterialism. Put forward by Ronald Inglehart 
(Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997; Abramson and Inglehart, 1995) it posits that the 
post-war experience of rising affluence, and continuous peace in the developed
world, means that people have changed their priorities. Rather than seeking 
material security, which it would appear they can now largely take for granted, 
people are primarily concerned with developing their opportunities for self-
expression and involvement. One consequence of this is that they are less likely 
to take what governments do on trust and instead seek more opportunities to be
involved in, and even to challenge, the decision-making process.
We  included  in  our  survey  the  most  commonly  used  indicator  of 
postmaterialism:
Looking at the list below, please tick a box next to the one thing
you  think should be Britain’s highest priority, the most
important thing it should do.
And which one do you think should be Britain’s next highest 
priority, the second most important thing it should do?
Maintain order in the nation
Give people more say in government decisions
Fight rising prices
Protect freedom of speech
Can’t choose
People who say that maintaining order and fighting prices are their two highest 
priorities are classified as ‘materialists’ (that is, their primary concern is with 
economic and physical security). Those who opt for freedom of speech and 
greater involvement in decision making are ‘postmaterialists’. Meanwhile, those
who choose any other mixture are regarded as having ‘mixed’ orientations.
If a rise in postmaterialism is to account for the decline in people’s confidence
in how they are governed then we need to be able to demonstrate two things: 
that postmaterialists have lower levels of trust and efficacy than materialists, 
and that the proportion of postmaterialists in Britain has increased. However,
while the first of these is only partly true, the second is not true at all. As the 
next table shows, postmaterialists are indeed less likely to trust governments to 
put the interests of the nation first at least most of the time. Just over one in ten 
postmaterialists falls into this category compared with as many as one in five 
materialists. But postmaterialists are little different in their level of system
efficacy from materialists.7 And most importantly, only 12 per cent of people in
Britain can be classified as postmaterialist, little different from the ten per cent
who fell into that category in 1983.8
Table 15 Trust and efficacy by materialist/postmaterialist orientations, 2000
% trust government 
just about always
or most of the time Base
% medium/high
efficacy Base
Materialist 20 402 29 402
Mixed 15 1081 32 1081
Postmaterialist 12 228 32 228
Declining social trust?
An alternative claim as to how social change may be undermining people’s 
confidence in how they are governed is that it reflects a decline in ‘social trust’;
that is, the degree to which people have trust in one another (Putnam, 1993,
2000). According to Putnam, in America at least, social trust is on the decline.
And if we no longer have trust in each other then perhaps we should not be
surprised that we do not trust in our politicians either.
Putnam’s arguments are addressed more fully in the chapters by Johnston and
Jowell and by Gardner and Oswald. Here we simply have to address the same
two arguments that we did in respect of postmaterialism: are those with low
levels of social trust less likely to trust governments or to have high levels of
efficacy, and has social trust declined in Britain in recent years? We also follow
the same strategy as we did in respect of postmaterialism by deploying the most
commonly used simple indicator of social trust:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
Whether or not there is a link at all between social and political trust is the
subject of some dispute. A number of studies have suggested that those who are
willing to trust other individuals are no more or less trusting of governments
than anyone else (Jackman and Miller, 1998; Newton, 1999; Newton and
Norris, 2000). However, this claim is disputed by Hall (1999: 454), while others
have suggested that, although such a relationship may exist, it is political trust
that helps generate social trust rather than the other way around (Levi and 
Stoker, 2000).9 In fact, our latest survey suggests that there is some relationship 
between social and political trust. Among those who say that “most people can 
be trusted”, one in five trust governments to put the interests of the nation first 
at least most of the time. But this figure falls to one in eight amongst those who 
believe that you cannot be too careful in your dealings with other people. And
there appears to be an even stronger relationship with political efficacy (see also
Johnston and Jowell, 1999). As many as 38 per cent of the trustful have a 
medium or high level of efficacy on our scale, compared with just 24 per cent of
the not so trustful.
However, as in the case of postmaterialism, there is no clear evidence that
levels of social trust have declined in Britain over time. As Johnston and Jowell
show in Table 8.5, the level of social trust measured by the British Social
Attitudes survey on three occasions between 1997 and 2000 mirrors that 
obtained by the World Values Survey in 1981 and 1990 – with around 45 per 
cent being ‘trustful’. Again it appears that British society has simply not
changed to the extent that has been claimed.
The decline of party identification
So far we have cast doubt on two of the wider social changes that might be
helping to undermine people’s confidence in the way they are governed. But
there is a further change within British society which remains worthy of 
exploration. This is the gradual and persistent decline in strength of attachment
to  political  parties  (Crewe  and  Thomson,  1999).  According  to  party
identification theory (Budge et al., 1976), those who have a strong attachment
to a political party are not only more likely to remain loyal to that party in the
polling booth, but are also more likely to support the political system. After all, 
they identify with a party that plays according to the rules of electoral 
competition in their country and this should help ensure their own respect for
and trust in those rules (Barry, 1970; Crewe et al., 1977). And if this is the case,
and if levels of party identification have declined, there would be good reason to
expect levels of political trust to decline as well.
The table below confirms that there has indeed been a gradual and persistent
decline in attachment to political parties over the last few decades. Whereas in
1987, 46 per cent said they felt “very” or “fairly” strongly attached to the party 
they supported, now only 32 per cent feel that way. Moreover, as in the case of 
trust and efficacy, strength of identification weakened notably in the mid-1990s
(though equally there was no sign of any recovery in the immediate wake of
Labour’s election to office in 1997).
Table 16 Trends in strength of party identification, 1987-2000
Strength of party identification 1987 1993 1996 1998 2000
Very strong 11 9 9 8 6
Fairly strong 35 33 28 28 26
Not very strong 40 44 47 48 49
No party identification 8 10 10 11 13
Base 2847 2945 3620 3145 3426
Meanwhile, we can also see in the next table that those with a strong party 
identification are more likely to have high levels of trust both in government 
and in system efficacy. For example, nearly three in ten of those with a “very 
strong” party identification trust governments just about always or most of the
time, compared with just one in twelve of those who do not identify with a party
at all. At last then, we seem to have a plausible explanation as to how long-term
changes among the British public have served to undermine confidence in the
country’s political system.
Table 17 Trust and efficacy by strength of party identification, 2000
Strength of party 
identification
% trust government 
just about always or 




Very strong 29 152 45 152
Fairly strong 22 581 40 581
Not very strong 15 1123 28 1120
No party identification 8 308 13 307
However, if this decline in party identification accounts for falling confidence in 
government we should not expect to find any changes in levels of trust and
efficacy among those with a strong party identification; there is no reason these
should not be as high now within this group as they ever were. But, as the 
following table shows, this  is not  what we find. The proportion of strong 
identifiers who trust governments at least just about always has fallen from
nearly a half in 1987 to under a third now. A similar decline has occurred
amongst all of the other levels of identification as well.10
Table 18 Trends in strength of party identification and trust in government,
1987-2000
Strength of party
identification % trust government just about always/most of the time
1987 Base 1996 Base 1998 Base 2000 Base
Very strong 48 188 25 106 34 153 29 152
Fairly strong 43 483 22 321 33 584 22 581
Not very strong 33 566 23 569 26 989 15 1123
No party
identification 14 93 19 110 21 241 8 308
All 37 1410 22 1173 28 2071 16 2293
So, at most, falling party identification can only account for part of the decline 
in trust and efficacy we have seen in recent years. Britain does indeed now have
fewer strong party identifiers who are encouraged by their enthusiasm into
having confidence in how they are governed. But, even among strong party
identifiers, their enthusiasm for their party seems less likely now to translate
into trust in how they are governed.
Conclusions
Three key findings have emerged from this study. First, the decline in 
confidence in how we are governed that emerged during the last Conservative 
government has  not  been reversed during Labour’s first term  of office. In 
particular, Labour’s programme of constitutional reform appears to have done 
little or nothing to reverse that decline. Second, although that decline in 
confidence may have depressed turnout at recent elections, its role should not be
exaggerated. Moreover, it appears to have had little impact on the public’s
willingness to engage in other forms of political participation. And third, falling
confidence does not appear to be primarily the product of irreversible social 
changes or forces such as globalisation. Labour’s attempts to reverse that 
decline may so far have failed but they cannot be accused of having engaged in
a Canute-like attempt to stop an irreversible tide of social change. Britain’s 
democracy may have something of a problem securing the support of its 
citizens, but it apparently does not face a fundamental crisis.
Constitutional reform might not have been the right remedy for the recent 
decline in confidence in government, but that does not mean that it is no remedy
at all. Equally, while restoring confidence in government might make some 
contribution to improving electoral turnout, it is unlikely to be a sufficient
remedy on its own. Rather, in order to understand recent trends in confidence
and participation we probably have to look at other political developments in 
recent years. Do governments deliver on their promises? Do politicians avoid 
accusations of sleaze? And does there seem to be much to choose between the
parties? Arguably the answers to those questions has been ‘no’ for too many 
voters under both the Conservative and Labour administrations in recent years 
to encourage voters to go to the polls or to have much confidence in how they 
are governed. If so, the future health of Britain’s democracy probably depends
on whether or not this must always be so.
Notes
1. Moreover, turnout in 1918 was reduced by the circumstances of war combined with 
a threefold expansion in the size of the electorate. In practice the level of voluntary 
abstention was higher in 2001 than at any time since the advent  of the  mass 
franchise.
2.  We may also note that there is no evidence that reported interest in politics has 
declined either. One in three say that they have a great deal or quite a lot of interest 
in politics, a figure that was virtually unchanged from when we first asked this 
question in 1986.
3. Our  latest  reading is  also  confirmed by  the  latest  State  of the  Nation survey 
conducted by ICM in autumn 2000. This found just 31 per cent saying that the 
system could not be improved or could only be improved in small ways (see 
www.icmresearch.co.uk).
4. Political efficacy is here measured using a Likert scale based on the first three items 
in Table x.4.  In each case the component items are scored from 1 = “Strongly 
agree” = low efficacy to 5 = “Strongly disagree” = high efficacy. Those classified as 
having low efficacy are those with an average rounded score across all three items of
1or 2, those as having high efficacy are those with an average score of 4 or 5 while 
those with an average score of 3 are those deemed to have medium efficacy. The 
scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66.
5. Moreover, we should note that the proportion who say that “It is everyone’s duty to
vote”, is at 64 per cent no different now from what it was in 1996, and is only four 
points lower than it was in 1991 and 1994. So there appears so far at least to be little 
undermining of the sense that voting is a civic duty. See also Electoral Commission 
(2001).
6. The range of explanations is discussed extensively in Norris (1999), Levi and Stoker
(2000) and Pharr and Putnam (2000).
7. The table in fact rather understates the impact of postmaterialism on trust in 
government. Postmaterialists tend to be highly educated and those with a degree 
tend to have higher levels of trust. The low level of trust amongst postmaterialists is 
thus even more remarkable given their educational level. However, multivariate 
analysis of the relationship between educational attainment, postmaterialism and
system efficacy indicates that the absence of any bivariate association between the 
last two is not the result of the potentially confounding impact of educational 
attainment.
8. The latter figure comes from the 1983 British Election Study.
9.  Moreover, Newton and Norris (2000) suggest that while there may be no 
relationship at the individual level, governments are able to perform  more 
effectively in societies with high levels of social trust and as a result are able to 
secure a higher level of political trust.
10. Equally when the level of trust in government rose in 1998, it rose amongst each 
group of identifiers.
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